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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Strictly Scrutinizing Fullilove v. Klutznick:
A Proposed Analytical Model for Supreme Court Review
of Congressional Legislation
The Supreme Court traditionally has evaluated equal protection chal-
lenges to the validity of legislation using racial classifications by applying an
ends-means analysis that incorporates a judicially fashioned standard of re-
view called "strict scrutiny."' In keeping with this tradition, Justice Powell
alone explicitly adopted a strict scrutiny approach with a few modifications to
join five other Justices in upholding a statutory preference for minority-owned
businesses. The six-to-three decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick 2 yielded no ma-
jority opinion, but it did hold that the congressional use of a racial quota in
affirmative action legislation did not violate the equal protection component of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Justice Marshall, in an opinion
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, determined that an ends-means
analysis with an intermediate standard was more appropriate for review of
affirmative action legislation. 3 Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion in which
Justices White and Powell4 joined, explicitly rejected the analytical formulas
applied in the other two concurring opinions.5 The analytical model the Chief
Justice devised, however, bore a striking resemblance to the strict scrutiny ap-
proach articulated in Justice Powell's separate opinion.6
It is the contention of this Note that contrary to Justice Powell's reason-
ing, the Court's standard of review in Fullilove should not have been triggered
by the racial classification itself, which customarily has dictated a strict scru-
tiny standard. Likewise, the standard should not have been triggered by the
benign purpose for which the racial quota was to be used, which, according to
Justice Marshall, would have dictated an intermediate standard. The standard
in Fullilove should have been determined, instead, by the fact that the Court
was reviewing an exercise of congressional power, a circumstance that consist- -
ently has demanded the most deferential standard, the rational basis standard
of review.7 This approach has its origins in the seminal decision of American
1. See text accompanying note 15 infra.
2. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
3. Id. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
4. Justice Powell, although concurring in Chief Justice Burger's opinion, wrote separately to
apply explicitly the strict scrutiny analysis he developed. Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 492 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). The Justices who wrote the other two concurring
opinions each stated that the analytical formulas they were applying in Fulllove had been articu-
lated in their opinions in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 448 U.S. at
496 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
6. See text accompanying notes 15-24 infra.
7. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325-26 (1980) (The Hyde Amendment, a congres-
sional amendment that did not permit federal reimbursement of all medically necessary abortions,
was considered to bear a "rational relationship" to the federal government's interest in protecting
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constitutional law, McCulloch v. Maryland.8 In 1819, while reviewing the con-
stitutionality of another act of Congress, Chief Justice John Marshall outlined
in McCulloch an ends-means analytical model containing a standard of review
consistent with this deferential attitude.9 The Fullilove opinions indicate, how-
ever, that the Court has forgotten this analytical approach and in so doing has
found itself unable to formulate a consistent and definitive equal protection
analysis for review of congressional legislation.
In focusing on the opinions written by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell, this Note will argue that the strict scrutiny approaches used in each
opinion are inappropriate for review of congressional legislation claimed to
violate the equal protection guarantee. Inconsistencies created by such an ap-
plication will be examined. In applying a more appropriate analytical
model-the McCulloch analysis-this Note will suggest how these inconsisten-
cies can be corrected. Finally, several reasons rooted in the political process
and confirmed by congressional history will be offered to support the applica-
tion of the McCulloch analysis to suits challenging the validity of congres-
sional legislation.
The Court in Fullilove examined the congressional enactment of the "mi-
nority business enterprise" (MBE) provision in the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977.10 This provision requires that, absent an administrative waiver,
at least ten percent of the federal funds granted to state and local governments
for public works projects must be set aside for minority businesses.11 Plaintiffs
in Fullilove alleged that the MBE provision violated the equal protection com-
ponent of the fifth amendment's due process clause, the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and several antidiscrimination statutes. 12
The federal district court upheld the validity of the MBE provision, 13 and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 14 A divided Supreme Court af-
the potential life of the fetus.); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 577-78 (1975) (The Court
upheld a congressional statute that accorded female naval officers a thirteen-year tenure of com-
missioned service before mandatory discharge for want of promotion, while requiring mandatory
discharge of male officers who were twice passed over for promotion but might have fewer than
thirteen years of service. "Congress may thus quite rationally have believed that women line
officers had less opportunity for promotion than did their male counterparts, and that a longer
period of tenure for women officers would, therefore, be consistent with the goal to provide wo-
men officers with 'fair and equitable career advancement programs.' "). See Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (Civil Service Commission regulation that excluded aliens
from employment in most federal service positions was held to vio ate the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. The Court stated in the course of its holding, however, that "if the rule were
expressly mandated by the Congress or the President, we might presume that any interest which
might rationally be served by the rule did in fact give rise to its adoption.").
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
9. For a description of this analytical model, see text accompanying notes 39-42 infra.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-28, §§ 101-111, 91 Stat. 116 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (Supp. III
1979)).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. III 1979) (The included minorities are "Negroes, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts."). The requirement may be waived when a
grantee demonstrates the infeasibility of achieving the ten percent requirement. Id.; see 123 Cong.
Rec. 5328-29 (1977) (remarks of Reps. Mitchell & Roe).
12. 448 U.S. at 455 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
13. Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
14. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978).
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firmed the lower court's decision on the grounds that the MBE provision did
not violate the equal protection component of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.
As mentioned previously, Chief Justice Burger's opinion and Justice Pow-
ell's separate concurrence both could be characterized as traditional strict scru-
tiny approaches with a few modifications. The traditional strict scrutiny
analysis considers three factors: (1) whether there is a compelling state inter-
est furthered by the legislation; (2) whether the means chosen are necessary to
effectuate that interest; and (3) whether less intrusive means are available to
effectuate that interest.15 In determining whether there was a "compelling
state interest" furthered by the legislation, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell asked whether Congress had the constitutional power to remedy past
discrimination and if Congress had sufficient findings which demonstrated
that this discrimination had adversely affected minority businesses. 16 Both
Justices concluded that the commerce and spending powers and the enforce-
ment clause of the fourteenth amendment 17 endowed Congress with the power
to remedy the effects of past discrimination.' 8 After an exhaustive review not
only of the administrative and legislative history of the bill, but also of the
"total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with the problems
of racial discrimination against minority business enterprises,"' 19 both Justices
determined that Congress had sufficient findings to establish that "purposeful
discrimination contributed significantly to the small percentage of federal con-
tracting funds that minority business enterprises [had] received."'20
In addressing the second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, the Justices
sought to determine whether the means chosen were "reasonably necessary" 21
or "narrowly tailored."22 In answering this question, both Justices conducted
a "searching examination" 3 of the quota by analyzing many factors, an exam-
ination akin to the "less intrusive means" test--the third prong of the tradi-
tional strict scrutiny analysis. Between them, the two Justices surveyed
(i) the efficacy of alternatives; (ii) the planned duration of the set-aside;
(iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be em-
ployed and the percentage of minority workers in the relevant work force or
population; (iv) the availability of quota waivers; (v) the effect of the set-aside
upon innocent third parties; and (vi) the under/over-inclusiveness of the
15. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 635, 637 (1969). See also Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1101-04 (1969). See generally G. Gunther,
Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 670-971 (10th ed. 1980); L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law 991-1136 (1978).
16. See 448 U.S. at 472-73 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
17. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ('The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."). Justice Powell concluded that the enforcement clause
of the thirteenth amendment was also a source of power. 448 U.S. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
18. See 448 U.S. at 472-76 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 499-500 (Powell, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 503 (Powell, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 506 (Powell, J., concurring). See id. at 486 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
21. Id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 480 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
23. Id. at 491 (opinion of Burger, CJ.).
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quota.24 Both Justices concluded the quota was permissible.
Although he used an ends-means analysis in his opinion, Justice Marshall
applied an intermediate standard that considered: (1) whether the racial clas-
sifications, designed to remedy the effects of past discrimination, served impor-
tant governmental objectives; and (2) whether the ten percent set-aside was
substantially related to achievement of these objectives. 25 He concluded that
the legislation met both tests.
The Court has addressed the claim of "reverse discrimination" as a viola-
tion of equal protection only once before-in Regents of the Universiy of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke.26 Bakke, a white male whose application to the state medical
school was rejected, challenged the legality of the school's admissions program
in which sixteen of the one hundred positions in the class were reserved for
"disadvantaged" minority students. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens,
Stewart and Rehnquist rejected the Regents' minority admissions quota on
statutory grounds.27 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun
reached the equal protection issue and found the quota unobjectionable. 28
Justice Powell broke the deadlock by rejecting the quota because it violated
the equal protection guarantee but indicated that some race-conscious action
may be acceptable. 29 Justice Powell set forth in Bakke the modified strict
scrutiny analysis he applied two years later in Fullilove. He held that the spe-
cial admissions program violated the fourteenth amendment because the ad-
missions committee did not have the authority to establish that it had
discriminated against minorities in the past. 30 In other words, the program
was illegal because it failed to satisfy the "compelling state interest" prong of
his modified strict scrutiny analysis.
In developing an equal protection analysis for suits challenging racial
classifications, the Court has held that racial classifications trigger the most
stringent level of judicial review and concomitant opportunity for judicial in-
tervention. 3 ' On the other hand, the Court has also held that review of an act
of Congress triggers the most deferential attitude or level ofjudicial scrutiny in
its equal protection analysis.32 These two judicial postures square off against
each other in a case such as Fullilove, in which a congressional statute is chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds because it uses a racial classification.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell attempted to resolve this conflict in
Fullilove by applying a modified strict scrutiny approach, creating several in-
consistencies in the course of their analyses. It is the contention of this Note,
24. Id. at 484-89 (opinion of Burger, CJ.); id. at 510-15 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
27. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Stewart & Rehnquist, J.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
28. Id. at 324-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
29. Id. at 269-324 (opinion of Powell, J.).
30. Id. at 309 (opinion of Powell, J.).
31. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
32. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
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however, that if the Justices had selected, instead, the most deferential analyti-
cal model-the McCulloch analysis--their constitutional analyses of the con-
gressional legislation would have avoided these inconsistencies. Furthermore,
they would have fulfilled their judicial duty of review without treading on
legislative ground.
In McCulloch Chief Justice Marshall had to determine whether Congress
had the power to incorporate a bank33 or whether such an exercise of power
violated the tenth amendment mandate that the powers "not delegated to the
United States. . . are reserved to the states. . .. -"34 Marshall first noted that
although the power to incorporate a bank was not specifically enumerated in
the Constitution, it could be considered an implied or incidental power-a
means by which to carry out other enumerated powers.35 More importantly,
the power to exercise these implied or incidental powers was specifically
granted to Congress in article I, section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution.36
That section states that Congress has the power "[tlo make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers. . . ,,37 In McCulloch, therefore, the power to in-
corporate a bank was an incidental or implied power-a "necessary and
proper" means-of executing five specifically enumerated powers: the power
"to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare
and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies."38
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the constitutionality of any exercise
of congressional power should be measured with reference to the following
rule:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 39
The Chief Justice's statement, which is the essence of the McCulloch analysis,
can be divided into a three-prong test which inquires: (1) whether there is an
enumerated power upon which the means (the incidental or implied power)
rests;40 (2) whether the means are "plainly adapted" to the ends;41 and
(3) whether the means are expressly prohibited by the Constitution or violate
a substantive constitutional right. 42
33. The first Congress had created and incorporated the first national bank in 1791, but its
charter was not renewed in 1811. In 1816 the Congress established the Second Bank of the United
States. G. Gunther, John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland 4 (1969).
34. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406 (quoting U.S. Const. amend: X).
35. Id. at 411.
36. Id. at 411-12.
37. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cL. 18.
38. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
39. Id. at 421.
40. This prong is analogous to the phrase "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the constitution."
41. This prong is the same as the phrase "[means] which are plainly adapted to that end." If
this prong and the third prong are satisfied, the means are "appropriate."
42. This prong is analogous to the phrase "[means] which are not prohibited, but consist with
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The Court held that the congressional decision to incorporate a bank was
a valid exercise of an enumerated power and, therefore, did not violate the
broad constitutional mandate of the tenth amendment. In so doing the Court
did not need to deal with the third prong of its analytical model which asks
whether the means selected violate any express prohibitions or substantive
rights in the Constitution. Instead, the Court merely implied that the tenth
amendment-a broad statement that is neither an express prohibition nor a
substantive right-was not violated if the first two prongs of the analysis were
satisfied. That is, the tenth amendment was not violated if (1) there was an
enumerated power upon which the means rested, and (2) the Congress was
validly exercising that enumerated power. The Court determined that the ex-
ercise of power was valid simply by examining the relationshp between the
enumerated power (the ends) and the implied or incidental power (the means).
That is, if the means were "plainly adapted" (or had a rational relationship) 43
to the ends, they were considered a valid exercise of the enumerated power. In
determining whether the means were "plainly adapted" to the ends, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall examined the contemporary record upon which Congress
grounded its decision to incorporate the bank; he did not merely imagine any
conceivable basis for the exercise of congressional power.44 The resulting
analysis, therefore, could be described as a classic ends-means analysis com-
bined with a standard of review that one commentator has called "rational
basis with bite."45
It is the contention of this Note that Fullilove and cases like it should be
analyzed under the first two prongs of the McCulloch analysis. That is, cases
should be treated under the McCulloch analysis if (1) they involve a congres-
the letter and spirit of the constitution." (The phrase "[means that] consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution" is the inverse of the phrase "[means] which are not prohibited.") If this
prong and the second prong are satisfied, the means are "appropriate."
43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409-10. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 15, § 5-3, at 230.
44. The court observed:
The bill for incorporating the bank of the United States did not steal upon an unsuspect-
ing legislature, id pass unobserved .... The original act was permitted to expire; but
a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the
government, convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure of its neces-
sity, and induced the passage of the present law.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
That [a bank] is a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of its
fiscal operations, is not now a subject of controversy. All those who have been con-
cerned in the administration of our finances, have concurred in representing its impor-
tance and necessity; and so strongly have they been felt, that statesmen of the first class,
whose previous opinions against it had been confirmed by every circumstance which can
fix the human judgment, have yielded those opinions to the exigencies of the nation.
Id. at 422-23.
In applying the rational basis standard of review the Court historically has allowed any con-
ceivable basis to support the congressional selection of means. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
45. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
"Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the Court would be
less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagination. It would have the Court




sional exercise of an enumerated power, (2) the means selected are claimed to
violate a broad constitutional mandate (such as the tenth amendment 46 or the
implied equal protection component of the fifth amendment) and (3) no sub-
stantive rights or express prohibitions are claimed to be violated. A compari-
son of the traditional strict scrutiny test and the McCulloch analysis will
illustrate the appropriateness of each analytical model when applied to cases
like Fullilove, which review the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
The first prong of the McCulloch analysis-that the means selected rest
upon an "enumerated power"-serves the same analytical purpose as the first
prong of the strict scrutiny analysis-that the means further a "compelling
state interest." The terms used in each, however, implicitly recognize the dif-
ference in sources of power upon which each analytical model rests. The term
"enumerated power" refers to those powers delegated to Congress in the Con-
stitution and directs the Court to that document when determining whether
the means selected rest upon a congressional power.47 "Enumerated power" is
a more accurate term for an analysis of the constitutionality of congressional
acts than the broader concept of "compelling state interest" because Congress
technically does not have any "interests" other than the powers specifically
enumerated in the Constitution. Use of the general term "interests" is more
appropriate when analyzing the validity of an exercise of state power since
state legislatures may exercise all power not reserved to the federal govern-
ment by the Constitution. In other words, Congress has only constitutionally
enumerated powers,48 while the states have no constitutionally enumerated
powers.49 From this distinction flows the major difference between strict scru-
tiny analysis and the McCulloch analysis-they rest on opposite underlying
presumptions.
The strict scrutiny analysis50 rests on the presumption that the enactment
of legislation containing racial classifications violates the equal protection pro-
vision of the fourteenth amendment51 because the state has no constitutionally
enumerated power with which to support its use of the classification. To be-
gin to overcome this presumption, the state first must demonstrate an over-
whelming or "compelling state interest," an interest which rises to the level of
a constitutional power. The presumption of invalidity is not rebutted, how-
ever, unless the racial classification (the means) is "necessary" to effectuate the
interest (the ends). To ensure that this second prong, the "necessary" stan-
dard, is met, the means are measured under the third prong of the strict scru-
tiny analysis: the Court determines if there are any "less intrusive means"
available to carry out the state goal. Under this most rigorous judicial stan-
46. U.S. Const. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
48. Id.
49. See U.S. Const. amend. X
50. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
51. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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dard the Court inquires extensively into the legislature's choice of means.5 2
The presumption is shifted, however, in the McCu/och analysis. That
analytical model rests on the presumption that the means selected do not vio-
late the Constitution if, under the first prong, Congress can support its selec-
tion of means with at least one enumerated power. Chief Justice Marshall
explained the presumption in these words:
The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed
on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates
of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that
it may not select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of
effecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of
establishing that exception.5 3
This presumption of validity ultimately rests on the notion that the provisions
in the Constitution are consistent with one another5 4 so that the mere exercise
of congressional constitutional power will not automatically violate another
constitutional provision.
This presumption of validity is tested under the second prong of the Mc-
Culloch analysis. The Court determines whether the exercise of power is valid
by examining the relationship between the enumerated power (the ends) and
the incidental or implied power (the means). In Fullilove, for example, the
contemporary record indicated that the racial classifications chosen were
"plainly adapted" or rationally related to the congressional goal in remedying
the effects of past discrimination pursuant to the enforcement clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the spending and commerce powers.55 The exer-
cise of power would almost certainly have been considered "appropriate"
under the MeCulioch analysis. The third prong of the analysis would not be
triggered in a case like Fullilove because the quota was not claimed to violate
any express prohibitions or substantive constitutional rights. Satisfaction of
52. Applying a strict scrutiny standard to review a state legislature's choice of means, while
using a more deferential standard to review an act of Congress, may produce seemingly inconsis-
tent results. That is, identical legislation may be deemed unconstitutional if enacted by a state
government but constitutional if passed by the Congress. These inconsistent results can be recon-
ciled-the Constitution grants Congress, and not the states, specific power to legislate in certain
areas. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). There the Court held that a New
York civil service law that provided that only United States citizens could hold permanent posi-
tions in the competitive class of the state's civil service violated the equal protection guarantee of
the fourteenth amendment. In contrast, in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 95 (1976),
the Court stated that Sugarman was not controlling if the Congress passed a similar statute be-
cause "Congress and the President have broad power over immigration and naturalization which
the States do not possess."
53. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409-10.
54. Chief Justice Marshall implicitly recognized this principle in McCulloch:
Even the 10th amendment ... omits the word "expressly," and declares only that the
powers "not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to
the States or to the people;" thus leaving the question, whether the particular power
which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one government, or
prohibited to the other, to depend on afair construction of the whole instrument.
Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
55. See 448 U.S. at 480-81 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 502-06 (Powell, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger conducted an extensive review of the contemporary record. Id. at 461-72
(opinion of Burger, CJ.).
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the first two prongs of the McCulloch analysis, which examine whether Con-
gress is validly exercising its powers, is sufficient to support the presumption
that the means do not violate the broad mandate of the equal protection
guarantee.
The McCulloch analysis ensures, therefore, that the congressional use of a
racial classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee, while al-
lowing Congress the freedom to exercise its broad legislative powers. This
analytical approach also corrects some inconsistencies created by the Court's
application of a modified strict scrutiny analysis in the congressional context.
One inconsistency arises when the Court applies a "necessary" standard to
review a congressionally authorized racial quota although the Court tradition-
ally has held that the Constitution permits Congress to exercise "any appropri-
ate means" in carrying out its enumerated powers.56 In McCulloch Chief
Justice Marshall interpreted the "necessary and proper" clause as demanding
only "appropriate" means, not "indispensibly necessary" ones.57 Subsequent
cases not only have reiterated this decision,58 but have applied this "appropri-
ate" standard when reviewing an exercise of congressional power under the
enforcement clauses of the thirteenth,59 fourteenth 60 and fifteenth 61 amend-
ments as well. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell aptly illustrate this
constitutional inconsistency in their opinions in Fullilove when they find them-
selves unable to reconcile their "necessary" means standards with the deferen-
tial, "appropriate" means standard they acknowledge has been traditionally
accorded congressional decisions. 62 In trying to resolve the conflict, the two
Justices watered down their "necessary" standards to a "reasonably neces-
sary" 63 and a "narrowly tailored" 4 standard. Yet, Justice Powell, at least, still
maintains he is applying a strict scrutiny standard of review.65
Furthermore, this application of strict scrutiny analysis means the Court
is adopting a judicial posture inconsistent with its strong tradition of according
deference to determinations made by a coequal branch of the federal govern-
ment.66 That is, in cases involving the congressional use of a racial classifica-
tion, the Court finds itself in a position where it can defeat a congressional
56. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
57. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414-16.
58. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-62 (1964); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941).
59. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation."). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-44 (1968).
60. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."). See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
61. U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."). See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-28 (1966).
62. See 448 U.S. at 490-92 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 480 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
65. Id. at 507 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. E.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
19821
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choice of "appropriate" means if they do not meet the stringent "necessary"
standard. Chief Justice Marshall commented on the impropriety of this in-
terventionist stance in McCulloch: "But where the law is not prohibited, and
is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to
inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circum-
scribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground."'67 In Full!-
love, for example, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell could have
invalidated the ten percent quota if it had failed any one of the numerous tests
they had erected to review it.68 If they had found, for example, that other
"less intrusive means" were available, that the planned duration of the set-
aside was too long, or that the quota was impermissibly under-inclusive or
over-inclusive, the quota could have been struck down as unconstitutional.
. The most compelling inconsistency arises when the strict scrutiny pre-
sumption of invalidity is applied to congressional exercises of constitutional
power. In a strict scrutiny analysis the Court presumes that a congressional
exercise of constitutional power violates the equal protection guarantee merely
because the legislation utilizes a racial quota. In failing to presume that these
constitutional provisions are more likely to be consistent than inconsistent
with one another, the Court could conceivably cancel out the legitimate exer-
cise of a constitutional power on the grounds that it violates another broad
constitutional provision, the parameters of which are amenable to a liberal
interpretation. 69 The results produced in such an analysis can be absurd in-
deed. In Fulllove, for example, the Court could have defeated the use of af-
firmative-action quotas on the grounds that such a practice violated the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment even though Congress passed
this legislation pursuant to several constitutional powers, including the en-
forcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, a provision that exhorts Con-
gress to carry out the equal protection guarantee. In other words, the
legitimate exercise of power to further a particular goal could have been struck
down as a violation of that same goal under a strict scrutiny analysis.
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)
(opinion of Holmes, J.).
In the McGrath opinion, Justice Frankfurter stated that the Court must have "due regard to
the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those
who also have taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for
carrying on government." 341 U.S. at 164.
67. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
68. These tests are presented at text accompanying note 24 supra.
69. In adopting a presumption of validity, the Court, in effect, is submitting to a congres-
sional determination of the meaning of a broad constitutional mandate. Such a stance is in keep-
ing with the settled constitutional rule "that as between two possible interpretations of a statute
. . . our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act." Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142,
148 (1927) (opinion of Holmes, J.).
In addition, it has been stated by at least one commentator that the Congress can make a
stronger argument than the Court as the most appropriate final authority to resolve controversies
about the meaning of the Constitution, a document whose content evolves over time. That argu-
ment rests on two democratic premises: "first, that law should be responsive to the interests of the
citizenry; and second, that in the long run it will be so only if lawmakers are amenable to popular
control through ordinary political processes." Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75
Mich. L. Rev. 1162, 1166 (1977).
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It has been argued that judicial deference to congressional decisions is
unsuited to legislation that includes racial classifications. Strict scrutiny is a
more effective standard, proponents argue, because in a political process in
which the majority rules, a minority cannot adequately protects its interests.70
It is contended that the equal protection provisions of the Constitution de-
mand that the judiciary protect "discrete and insular minorities."' 7I One com-
mentator, however, has answered this argument by pointing out that the
political process leading to deliberate congressional decisions affecting minori-
ties contains internal safeguards for minority interests.72 Among these safe-
guards is the "effect upon the political process of an extraordinary variety of
interest groups" and their "crosscutting loyalties and identities. ' 73 The "inter-
est group" safeguard has been explained this way:
To mobilize a majority of the votes in an election, each political
party must appeal to a variety of "interests" and a wide spectrum of
opinion. As a consequence of their catholicity, the major parties are
unthinkable as instruments of tyranny because "it is impossible for
the party in power to oppress any element of the opposition party
without oppressing a corresponding element within its own ranks."
In addition, the party in power knows that any effort to "tyrannize" a
particular minority may also antagonize other groups in the majority
coalition, as well as the "independents" pursued by both major par-
ties, and, therefore, may cost it the next election.
In short, the "monolithic" majority. . . does not exist; the ma-
jority is but a coalition of minorities which must act in a moderate,
broadly representative fashion to preserve itself.74
In addition, the organizational structure and procedures of Congress per-
mit minority groups to exercise power beyond their mere numbers to protect
their interests.75 They can prevent the enactment of unfavorable legislation by
using several devices, including the following examples:76 the committee sys-
tem;77 the filibuster in the Senate78 and the Rules Committee in the House.79
70. E.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
71. Id. at 152 n.4.
72. Sandalow, supra note 69, at 1190-91.
73. Id. at 1190.
74. Id. (quoting Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote,
One Value, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 52) (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 1192.
76. Id.
77. The committee system has been defined as follows:
A committee may approve, alter (even totally revamp), kill or ignore proposals re-
ferred to it. It is difficult-almost impossible--to circumvent a committee that is deter-
mined not to act; a bill that has been approved by a committee may be amended when it
reaches the House or Senate floor, but extensive changes are difficult and seldom occur.
The work of a committee essentially becomes the work of Congress.
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Congress 365 (2d ed. 1976).
78. The filibuster has been defined as follows:
A time delaying tactic used by a minority in an effort to prevent a vote on a bill
which probably would pass if brought to a vote. The most common method is to take
advantage of the Senate's rules permitting unlimited debate, but other forms of parlia-
mentary maneuvering may be used. The stricter rules in the House make filibusters
1982]
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Commentators conclude, therefore, that strict judicial review of deliberately
considered congressional legislation "merely permits courts to substitute their
decisions for those of Congress . ... 80 It can be argued in response that
only well-organized, powerful minority groups are protected in such a demo-'
cratic system, so that judicial intervention is required to protect impotent mi-
norities. However, if a minority is the target of invidious, or irrational,
discrimination, judicial review using the McCulloch analysis should detect it.81
Finally, the statistics reflecting Supreme Court decisions on the constitu-
tionality of state and federal statutes indicate that the political process leading
to deliberate congressional decisions does provide adequate protection for mi-
norities. While the Supreme Court repeatedly has struck down state laws that
use invidious racial classifications,82 it has never found the congressional use
more difficult, but they are attempted from time to time through various delaying tactics
arising from loopholes in House rules.
Id. at xxvi (glossary of congressional terms).
79. The House Rules Committee has been defined as follows:
The House Rules Committee has long stood as a strategic gateway between the
legislative committees and the floor of the House for a small but important part of the
chamber's legislative business. The power of the committee lies in its roles of setting the
agenda and allotting time for debate on those important and usually controversial bills
that are not disposed of by the more routine procedures of the House. Thus the commit-
tee often has been able to prevent or delay bills it opposes from reaching the House floor.
Id. at 385.
80. Sandalow, supra note 69, at 1192.
81. For example, assume that Congress were to pass a ten percent quota favoring white-
owned businesses. Such a set-aside should be declared unconstitutional because presumably there
would be no findings of discrimination against whites to support a rational relationship between
the use of the quota and the congressional power exercised, i.e., the enforcement clause of the
fourteenth amendment under which Congress has an interest in remedying the effects of
discrimination.
82. A cursory examination of the list of state laws which the Supreme Court has declared
unconstitutional reveals that well over fifteen cases involved statutes which on their face invidi-
ously discriminated against members of racial minorities. E.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333
(1968) (Alabama statutes requiring racial segregation in prisons and jails violate the equal protec-
tion clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Vir statute prohibiting interracial mar-
riage violates the equal protection clause); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (Florida
criminal statute prohibiting an unmarried interracial couple from habitually living in and occupy-
ing the same room in the nighttime violates the equal protection clause); Lassiter v. United States,
371 U.S. 10 (per curiam) (Louisiana laws that segregated passengers in terminal facilities of com-
mon carriers violate the equal protection clause), afl'g 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La. 1962); Turner v.
City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (Tennessee statute and administrative regulation sanction-
ing racial segregation in a private restaurant operated on premises leased from a city violate the
equal protection clause); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (Mississippi statutes that required
racial segregation at interstate and intrastate transportation facilities violate the equal protection
clause); Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (per curiam) (Louisiana statutes
violated the equal protection clause when they (1) provided for segregation of races in public
schools and the withholding of funds from integrated schools, (2) conferred on the Governor the
right to close all schools upon integration of any one of them, and (3) directed the Governor to
supersede a school board under a court order to desegregate and take over management of public
schools violate the equal protection clause), afl'g 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960); State Athletic
Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (per curiam) (Louisiana statute prohibiting athletic con-
tests between Negroes and white persons violates the equal protection clause), atFg 168 F. Supp.
149 (E.D. La. 1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per cunam) (Alabama statutes that required
segregation of white and Negro races on motor buses in the City violate the equal protection
clause), atfg 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(state constitutional and statutory provisions requiring segregation of white and Negro children in
public schools on the basis of race deny Negro children the equal protection of the laws); McLau-
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of a racial classification unconstitutional.8 3 It can be argued that resort to
these statistics merely begs the question as to the legitimacy of congressional
legislation; the Supreme Court simply does not dare undo congressional deter-
minations.84 However, an inference can be drawn from the statistics that it is
the states, which do not have the same political checks that Congress has, that
historically have enacted legislation containing invidious racial classifications,
not Congress. Indeed, in light of Congress' passage of civil rights legislation
since at least 1875,85 it is unlikely that it would begin suddenly to discriminate
invidiously now.
rin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (Oklahoma law requiring segregation in edu-
cational facilities at institutions of higher learning violates the equal protection clause); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Texas constitutional and statutory provisions restricting admission to
the University of Texas Law School to white students violate the equal protection clause); Sipuel
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam) (Oklahoma constitutional and statutory
provisions barring Negroes from the University of Oklahoma Law School violate the equal pro-
tection clause because the University Law School is the only institution for legal education main-
tained by the State); Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (Missouri statute that
accorded Negro residents financial aid to enable them to obtain instruction at out-of-state univer-
sities equivalent to that afforded exclusively to white students at the University of Missouri vio-
lates the equal protection clause because the obligation to give equal protection of the laws can be
performed only within a state's own jurisdiction); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (Texas
White Primary Law that barred Negroes from participation in Democratic Party primary elections
violates the equal protection clause); and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (West
Virginia law barring Negroes from jury service violates the equal protection clause).
Moreover, this number does not take into account the cases that were facially neutral, but
whose effect, nonetheless, was to discriminate invidiously against a racial minority. E.g., United
States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972) (North Carolina statute that au-
thorized creation of a new school district in a city that was part of a larger county school system is
void inasmuch as its effect would be to impede the dismantling of the dual school system by
affording a refuge to white students fleeing desegregation); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (California constitutional provision adopted on referendum repealing "open housing" law
and prohibiting state abridgment of realty owner's right to sell and lease, or to refuse to sell and
lease as he pleases, violates the equal protection clause); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964)
(Louisiana statute requiring that m all primary, general or speci4elections, the nomination pa-
pers and ballots shall designate the race of the candidates violates ae equal protection clause).
83. Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld the congressional use of a racial classification
three times in modem history. Besides Fullilove, the Court sanctioned the use of a suspect classifi-
cation in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943). Those two decisions, which upheld the placing of citizens of Japanese ancestry
under curfew and in camps during World War II, have been severely criticized. However, those
two cases should not be used as evidence in maintaining that strict scrutiny analysis and its con-
comitant presumption of validity are needed to review congressional legislation, or that a more
deferential standard does not provide sufficient judicial review. This is so because the two cases
both passed the strict scrutiny analysis that the Court applied. Also, it would be inaccurate to use
those cases as evidence that Congress invidiously discriminates, because the classifications were
not formed in the course of deliberate decision making by the Congress, but rather were made
pursuant to a broad delegation of power to the military.
84. The congressional power to curtail Supreme Court jurisdiction, see U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, could be considered a powerful incentive for the Court to give its imprimatur to congressional
legislation.
85. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335, provided in part:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations. . . of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color,
regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
The Supreme Court held in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the law was unconstitu-
tional because it was not supported by the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments.
1982]
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In sum, adoption of the McCulloch analysis for review of congressional
legislation would cure the inconsistencies that flow from an application of the
strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, in using such an analysis, the Supreme
Court would not "tread on legislative ground"8 6 in ensuring that Congress has
obeyed the Constitution.87
LISA MARIE NIEMAN
86. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
87. It is interesting to note that in an apparent abandonment of the strict scrutiny, interven-
tionist stance, the Court recently adopted in Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981), an analy-
sis similar to the MeCulloch analysis. In writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that a
congressional statute authorizing the President to require the registration of males and not females
did not violate the fifth amendment's equal protection component. This determination was based
largely on the ground that Congress was exercising its authority over national defense and mili-
tary affairs and that "in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference." Id. at
2651. Although it refused to advance "any further 'refinement' in the applicable [equal protec-
tion] tests," id. at 2654, the Court found the exemption of women from registration was "closely
related" to Congress' purpose in authorizing registration. Id. at 2658. However, the articulated
reasons for the exemption found in the congressional record were based primarily on administra-
tive convenience. The Court stated, "It is not for this Court to dismiss such [administrative]
problems as insignificant in the context of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future
mobilization." Id. at 2660. Administrative convenience, however, has never been sufficient to
justify a gender classification. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Presumably
administrative convenience would not be sufficient to support a classification examined under the
rational basis standard because such a classification involves the "very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the [Constitution]. . . ." Id. at 690 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971)).
See also Loewy, Returned to the Pedestal-The Supreme Court and Gender Classification
Cases: 1980 Term, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 87 (1981).
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Civil Procedure-Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital- Discovery
of a Nontestifying Expert
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1970 to in-
clude a separate provision for the pretrial discovery of experts,' the federal
district courts have ruled several times on the discoverability of a nontestifying
expert's identity under rule 26(b)(4)(B). 2 It was not until Ager v. Jane C.
Stormont Hospital,3 however, that a court of appeals reviewed this issue. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in rejecting the rationale
advanced by a majority of district courts that had considered the issue,4 held
that the discovering party must show exceptional circumstances to justify dis-
closure of the identity and field of expertise of a nontestifying, specially em-
ployed or retained expert, or of any other collateral information relating to
that expert.5
InAger plaintiff, through her father, brought a malpractice action against
defendants Stormont-Vail Hospital and Dr. Dan Tappen for injuries sustained
at birth.6 Subsequently, Dr. Tappen drafted a series of interrogatories, three
of which essentially asked plaintiff to reveal the names and addresses of all
experts who were contacted in preparation for the malpractice action.7 The
magistrate ordered plaintiff to answer the interrogatories unless the experts
were only informally consulted, rather than specially employed or retained.
Plaintiff refused to provide the identity of the consultative experts who were
not expected to testify, apparently on the ground that an expert who is unable
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) states:
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained
or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule
35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for
the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other
means.
For a general survey of the new rule, see Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. Ill. L.F. 895 [here-
inafter cited as Graham, Part One].
2. See notes 43-59 and accompanying text infra.
3. 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980).
4. See notes 50-59 and accompanying text infra.
5. 622 F.2d at 503.
6. During Emily Ager's birth, her mother suffered a massive rupture of the uterine wall,
resulting in Mrs. Ager's death. Also, the placenta prematurely separated from the uterine wall,
resulting in fetal asphyxia. As a consequence, Emily suffered severe neurological dysfunction and
now is a mentally impaired quadraplegic with no control over her bodily functions. Id. at 498.
7. The specific interrogatories at issue were:
1. Have you contacted any person or persons, whether they are going to testify or not,
in regard to the care and treatment rendered by Dr. Dan Tappen involved herein?
2. If the answer to the question immediately above is in the affirmative, please set forth
the name of said person or persons and their present residential and/or business
address.
3. If the answer to question #1 is in the affirmative, do you have any statements or
written reports from said person or persons?
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to aid the party and will not testify falls within the definition of an informally
consulted expert. The magistrate rejected plaintiff's view that the classification
of an expert as retained or specially employed was determined by the value of
the expert's opinion and ruled that if a medical expert "is paid or makes a
charge for such service, he has been 'retained' or 'specially employed' within
the meaning of the Rule."8 Plaintiff, therefore, was required to answer the
interrogatories. Rather than respond, plaintiff sought review, but the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas affirmed the magistrate's order.
Plaintiff again refused to reveal the identity of her consultative experts, and a
civil contempt order was entered against plaintiff's attorney, who had agreed
to accept all sanctions.
On appeal, plaintiff challenged the contempt power of the district court9
and raised two discovery issues. The first involved the proper means, for dis-
covery purposes, of distinguishing between an expert who was retained or spe-
cially employed in anticipation of litigation and one who was only informally
consulted.' 0 The second raised the question of proper criteria to be used in
determining discoverability of an expert found to have been specially em-
ployed or retained.'1
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure distinguishes be-
tween experts who will testify at trial and those who will not. 12 Subsection (A)
provides for-the discovery, through interrogatories, of the names of experts
who will testify at trial and the subject matter of their testimony. 13 Subsection
(B), however, permits discovery of nontestifying experts only if they were spe-
cially employed or retained, and even then discovery is allowed only under
special circumstances.1 4 Because no reference was made to informally con-
sulted experts in rule 26(b)(4), the Advisory Committee maintained that dis-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 499-500. The court held the civil contempt order to be dependent on the validity of
the underlying order. Id. at 500. Plaintiff's attorney, therefore, would be held in contempt only if
the court affimed the trial court's ruling on the discovery issues.
10. See notes 15-24 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 28-63 and accompanying text infra.
12. This distinction was the subject of much debate when first proposed. One commentator
stated:
In setting a higher standard for discovery of materials prepared by experts who are
not prospective witnesses, the Proposed Rule implicitly recognizes that fear of discovery
may deter thorough preparation in cases where an expert's work is not indispensable.
Litigants may refrain from hiring experts when the threat of discovery is great. How-
ever, when an expert's work is indispensable-when the expert will be called as a wit-
ness-the danger of surprise and the possible introduction of new issues justify the
abandonment of high standards for discovery, especially since the threat of disclosure of
information favorable enough to be used at trial probably will not deter preparation of a
case.
Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 271, 282
(1968). But see Note, Civil Procedure-Discovery of Expert Information, 47 N.C.L. Rev. 401,406
(1969): "The first party to reach and 'buy' an expert, because of the stringent showing required for
discovery of non-testifying experts, would be able to suppress unfavorable findings of that expert
simply by declining to offer his testimony at trial."
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
14. Id. 26(b)(4)(B).
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covery of informally consulted experts is unavailable.' 5 All courts that have
considered the question have recognized this prohibition as it relates to the
discovery of expert identity and opinions, 16 although some courts have as-
serted, in dicta, that in extreme circumstances even discovery of informally
consulted experts may be permitted.' 7 Unfortunately, the Advisory Commit-
tee did not define "informally consulted," and the Ager court had to distin-
guish between the two classes of experts.
Several different tests for distinguishing between informally consulted
and specially retained experts were discussed inAger. Plaintiff argued that an
expert was informally consulted and excluded from discovery if the consulting
party considered the expert to be of no assistance.18 Using a different ap-
proach, the Ager trial court relied on the formality of the consultation, placing
emphasis on the payment of a fee and a scheduled appointment.' 9 The court
of appeals, believing that the trial court's test was too rigid, took a third view
and held that an expert's status must be determined on an ad hoc basis.20
Among the factors the court of appeals considered relevant were:
(1) the manner in which the consultation was initiated; (2) the nature,
type and extent of information or material provided to, or deter-
mined by, the expert in connection with his review; (3) the duration
and intensity of the consultative relationship; and (4) the terms of the
consultation, if any (e.g. payment, confidentiality of test data or opin-
ions, etc.). Of course, additional factors bearing on this determina-
tion may be examined if relevant.21
In many cases the Ager test yields the same result as the no-assistance test
suggested by plaintiff.22 After a preliminary meeting, the consulting party
15. Id. 26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes. See also 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2033 (1970). The Committee probably made this distinction because informally
consulted experts are more likely to cooperate with the adverse party than are those who have
been specially employed. Graham, Part One, supra note 1, at 938 n.172.
16. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 256 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Wei-
ner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Bald v. B.F. Diamond Constr.
Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976); Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
17. See, e.g., Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974). Discovery should be allowed in
some unusual circumstances. For example, if as a result of destructive testing the expert is the
only one with knowledge of the facts, then the "exceptional circumstances" test should override
the "informally consulted" test. "This approach would neither discourage a party from searching
for expert witnesses, nor would it deprive a party of discovery from an expert who had not been of
assistance to the adversary when exceptional circumstances have been shown." Graham, Part
One, supra note I, at 940.
18. 622 F.2d at 501. Professor Graham states that "[a] consulting party may consider the
expert of no assistance because of his insufficient credentials, his unattractive demeanor, or his
excessive fees." Graham,,Part One, supra note 1, at 939-40 n.182.
19. 622 F.2d at 501. If an attorney met a doctor socially and they discussed the case without
a consultation charge, then it would be viewed as an informal consultation. Id. See USM Corp. v.
American Aerosols, Inc., 631 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1980) (lack of compensation a factor in determin-
ing that expert was informally consulted).
20. 622 F.2d at 501.
21. Id.
22. The strictest test of the three was that proposed by the trial court. The court of appeals
implied that, under the trial court's test, if a telephone inquiry were made in which an expert
provided general information and a fee were charged, the expert would be specially employed.
See id. at 502. While the court may have exaggerated to make its point, the trial court's test
19821
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may determine that the expert will be of no assistance because he is unfamiliar
with the theory or techniques involved, he advocates a school of thought that
is unfavorable to the party's action or he charges excessive fees. Since the
consultative relationship was of a short duration and nothing more than gen-
eral information was exchanged, a court using the Ager test would label it an
informal consultation, as would a court using the no-assistance test. A conflict
arises, according to the Ager court, when the consulting party does not dis-
cover that the expert will be of no assistance until after a working relationship
has been established.23 Perhaps the undesirable information or characteristics
are not revealed until a series of meetings have taken place or the expert has
made a preliminary analysis. While this expert may be considered informally
consulted under the no-assistance test, the Ager court believed that considera-
tion of the factors it listed would cause the expert to be labelled specially em-
ployed.2 4 If an expert finally is deemed to have been informally consulted, no
discovery may ensue. If, on the other hand, an expert is deemed specially
employed or retained, the second prong of the Ager test, under rule
26(b)(4)(B), requires a showing of exceptional circumstances before an expert
may be the subject of discovery.
The Ager court realized, however, that rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not address
affirmatively the question of discoverability of a nontestifying expert's iden-
tity. Rather,. it turned to the Advisory Committee Notes, which suggest that
discovery was available on "proper showing. ''25 The court equated this to a
showing of exceptional circumstances. 26
The requirement of showing exceptional circumstances promotes the pol-
icy of allowing a party to seek advice freely without fear that the expert will
later disclose to the opposing party information gained during consultation.27
The expert may know facts that would be detrimental if possessed by the op-
posing party. Additionally, the expert may be aware of litigation strategy. It
was imperative, therefore, for the rulemakers to fashion rule 26(b)(4)(B) to
protect the retaining party. Defendant inAger, on the other hand, argued that
discovery of an expert's identity did not violate the policies of the rule 26(b)
provisions,28 which were designed to prevent the discovering party from using
his opponent's resources, diligence and aggressive preparation to develop his
own case.29 Defendant contended that after he knew which experts plaintiff
requires little in the way of balancing. Any consultation with a semblance of formality will result
in the retention of the expert, regardless of the duration or fruitfulness of the relationship.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. "As an ancillary procedure, a party may on a proper showing require the other party to
name experts retained or specially employed, but not those informally consulted." Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes.
26. 622 F.2d at 503. Contra, 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 15, § 2032 (properly
worded interrogatory satisfies the "proper showing" requirement).
27. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. Ill. L.F. 169, 194 [hereinafter cited
as Graham, Part Two].
28. 622 F.2d at 502.
29. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes.
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had retained, he would have to rely on his own diligence and resourcefulness
to contact the experts and enlist their assistance.30 This is precisely one prob-
lem that rule 26(b)(4)(B) seeks to avoid. The Ager court noted several reasons
why the discovery of an expert's identity, without an exceptional circumstance
requirement, may lead to the discovery of information and opinions that
would have been nondiscoverable under rule 26(b)(4)(B). 3 1 After discovery,
the litigant may contact the expert, who would in turn provide the litigant with
relevant facts and views on the case. Despite the apparent unfairness that such
an activity would create, the likelihood of its occurrence may be minimal. A
doctor-patient privilege or some other ethical or moral duty would probably
prevent the expert from revealing freely the product of his employment with
the retaining party. As an added precaution, one commentator has suggested
that a party who anticipates that the court is going to permit disclosure of an
expert's identity absent a showing of exceptional circumstances should draft a
contractual agreement that prohibits the expert from discussing the case with
other parties to the suit.32
The Ager court also recognized the possibility that the discovering party
may compel the expert to testify after disclosure of his identity.33 Although
the court questioned the propriety of this action,34 other federal courts have
used their subpoena powers to force experts to testify.35 Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that a party's expert will be called by the opposing party because most
litigants would fear that their adversaries' experts would be "client-oriented"
and uncooperative on the witness stand.3 6 Professor Friedenthal argues that
even if the expert is called, the retaining party can successfully maintain that
the discovering party should be required to use his own expert if the retaining
party shows that there are other, similarly competent experts available.37
Friedenthal's analysis, in effect, permits trial examination upon a showing of
30. 622 F.2d at 502-03.
31. Id. at 503.
32. Graham, Part Two, supra note 27, at 195. A finding of exceptional circumstances by the
court would, of course, supersede any such contract.
33. 622 F.2d at 503.
34. Id. at 503 n.6.
35. See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
929 (1973); United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1962);
Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941). State courts are split on
the issue but lean toward the federal practice. Graham, Part One, supra note 1, at 935.
36. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 Stan. L.
Rev. 455, 484 (1962). See also Graham, Part One, supra note I, at 934.
37. Friedenthal, supra note 36, at 484. Even if there are experts available, in some cases it
would be appropriate to compel the expert to testify. Friedenthal asserts:
But even if the basic information is available and there are experts willing to be
employed, this does not mean that they are as informed, as capable of analyzing the
problems, or as adept at testifying at trial as is the adverse party's expert. Indeed, it may
be that out of a group of five or six capable experts in a field only one would agree with a
litigant. If he is one of two hired by the adverse party, the fact that there are three or
four others willing to be employed will not be of much assistance. If availability of other
experts were the sole criterion for prohibiting disclosure the need for expert testimony
might often result in a race between litigants to employ the most prominent expert whose




exceptional circumstances. Unlike discovery, however, the retaining party
must prove an absence of exceptional circumstances, rather than placing the
burden on the discovering party to prove their existence.
Furthermore, the Ager court feared that by permitting discovery without
demonstrating exceptional circumstances the discovering party may use the
information to influence unduly the jury. The court hypothesized that the dis-
covering party could ask his opponent, at trial, if he had retained any experts
who were not going to testify. By doing so, the discovering party would hope
to leave the jury with "an inference that the retaining party is attempting to
suppress adverse facts or opinions. '' 3  The court implied that such questioning
might be improper but that it may be admitted into evidence. 39 While the
possibility does exist, it appears that the relevancy of such questioning is low
and the chance of undue influence high. Thus a court would be expected to
instruct both parties that the information was irrelevant and all statements
relating to the employment of retained experts were inadmissible.40
Finally, the Ager court noted the adverse effect that unlimited discovery
would have on the number of experts willing to discuss a potential law suit. In
particular the court agreed with appellant's fear that the number of candid
opinions supplied by medical experts would decrease. 41 Because of the "wide-
spread aversion" among health-care providers to assist in malpractice actions,
the number of consultative experts is limited. Physicians may be unwilling to
provide evaluative consultations if discovery of their identities may be ob-
tained whether or not they ultimately testify. "[A]ccess to informed opinions
is desirable in both prosecuting valid claims and eliminating groundless ones
"42
There is currently a split of decisions among district courts on the neces-
sity of showing exceptional circumstances, with the court of appeal's decision
in Ager representing the minority view among the district courts. The ap-
proach taken byAger was first articulated by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co. ,43 which
held that a showing of exceptional circumstances was required to discover a
nontestifying expert's identity. The court stated that the rigorous standards
pertaining to the discovery of facts and opinions held by experts under rule
26(b)(4)(B) should be applied to disclosure of identity.44 The Perry court
38. 622 F.2d at 503.
39. See id.
40. A similar instruction was suggested by Professor Graham in regard to an expert who
previously was retained by one party but at trial was a witness for the other party. Graham, Part
Two, supra note 27, at 196.
41. 622 F.2d at 503.
42. Id. (quoting Brief of Appellant at 27-28, 29-30).
43. 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971). In Perry plaintifffireman was struck by a fire truck as he
attempted to activate a water pump manufactured and installed by defendant. Defendant re-
quested the identity of all experts who examined the truck and the pump shortly after the accident.
Id. at 279.




found support for this view in rule 26(e), which provides: "(1) A party is
under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with respect to any ques-
tion directly addressed to ... (B) the identity and location of each person
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial. . . -45 The court inferred
from this provision that identity was discoverable only after an expert was
expected to testify.46
The only other federal court47 to enforce an exceptional circumstances
requirement, prior to Ager, was the United States District Court for Massa-
chusetts in Guilloz v. Falmouth HospitalAssociatlon.48 The magistrate in that
case noted that rule 26(b)(4)(B) contained no provision for disclosure of an
expert's identity and that the Advisory Committee's "proper showing" re-
quirement amounted to a showing of exceptional circumstances. To demon-
strate exceptional circumstances, the discovering party must prove that the
information is relevant and material to the litigation.49
Those courts that have rejected the analysis taken by Ager have followed
the reasoning of Professors Wright and Miller 5° and have held that no special
showing is required in order to discover the identity of an opposing party's
expert. 5 1 The leading cases articulating this view are Sea Colony, Inc. v. Conti-
45. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
46. 54 F.R.D. at 280. The court's reliance on rule 26(e) was unfounded. The purpose of this
provision is to supply the opposing party with an updated list of all expert witnesses so that he
may prepare for cross-examination; it does not imply that the experts were unknown to that party
prior to supplementation.
47. A state court has construed its parallel discovery provision to require a showing of excep-
tional circumstances. Trainor v. Young, 348 So. 2d 1004 (La. App.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 169
(La. 1977) (defendant sought identity of doctor consulted about merits of medical malpractice suit;
held not discoverable absent exceptional circumstances).
48. 21 F.R. Serv. 2d 1367 (D. Mass. 1976).
49. Id. at 1369-71. Guiloz deserves further analysis. As a precautionary measure, plaintiffs
attorney always consulted a doctor before instituting a malpractice suit to ensure that the action
was not frivolous. Defendant asserted that the doctor was an "educating expert" whose identity
and area of expertise were discoverable under Massachusetts practice. Id. at 1368.
An educating expert, as opposed to a testifying expert, is largely immune from dis-
covery, except for his name and the subject of his knowledge and opinions. The facts he
knows and the opinions he holds are generally undiscoverable in all but the highly
unique situations. Before the immunity obtains, of course, the party seeking to establish
immunity must show that the expert was hired in anticipation of trial. At that point the
burden shifts, and the party attempting to discover the contents of the expert's mind
must demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
Id. (quoting 7 J. Smith & H. Zobel, Massachusetts Practice 214 (1974)).
Plaintiff claimed that defendant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances. The doctor
was simply a "consulting expert" who informed plaintiff that he had a colorable claim. Discovery
of his identity would not lead to any admissible evidence. Furthermore, plaintiff argued that it
was necessary to keep the identity private to avoid embarassment to the doctor. The court ac-
cepted plaintiffs argument, recognizing that, by divulging his name, the doctor's future usefulness
would be destroyed and that defendant had not asserted a corresponding benefit to be gained
through discovery. Id. at 1371.
50. See 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 15, § 2032.
51. E.g., Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Roesburg v. Johns
Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83
F.R.D. 256 (N.D. IW. 1979); Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Bald v. B.F. Diamond Con-
str. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976); Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113 (D.
Del 1974).
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[Vl
nental Insurance Co.52 and Baki v. B.F Diamond Construction Co.,s3 both
United States district court cases. In Sea Colony defendant requested the
"names of all experts retained by plaintiff who were not intended to be called
at trial," but plaintiff refused to comply, claiming that the information was
work product and that defendant had made no showing of exceptional circum-
stances.54 After dismissing the work product argument,55 the court empha-
sized that the rule 26(b)(4)(B) exceptional circumstances requirement
pertained only to the impracticality of obtaining "facts or opinions." Because
rule 26(b)(4)(B) did not mention identity, exceptional circumstances were not
required in order to discover only the identity of an expert.5 6 In Baki, which
followed Sea Colony, the court noted that the general discovery provision, rule
26(b)(1), provides for the discovery of "persons having knowledge of any dis-
coverable matter."57 The court stressed that rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not mention
"identity" because the authority to obtain an expert's identity is found in rule
26(b)(1). 58 A number of cases following Baki have employed the same rea-
soning to allow discovery of a nontestifying expert's identity.5 9
Commentators also have argued that an expert's identity should be freely
discoverable. Professor Graham recognized that awareness of an expert's
identity may be helpful if he is associated with a particular school of thought
or approach to the conflict.60 By discovering his identity the discovering party
could prepare for trial accordingly. The circumstances in Sea Colony raise the
dilemma that until a party is aware of the identity of the adverse party's re-
tained experts, he may be unable to determine whether there are exceptional
circumstances, which are required under rule 26(b)(4)(B) to discover facts or
opinions of the experts.61 While these contentions have some merit, it appears
that the benefits of disclosure are outweighed by the possible abuses of unlim-
ited discovery as articulated in Ager. The rulemakers adopted a discovery
52. 63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974).
53. 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976).
54. 63 F.R.D. at 113.
55. Id. at 114. The trial court cited the Advisory Committee, which had rejected "as ill-
considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert information within the work-product
doctrine." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes.
56. 63 F.R.D. at 114.
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
58. 71 F.R.D. at 182. The party opposing discovery may avoid answering the interrogatories
if he can show that the information "is irrelevant, privileged, or for some other reason should not
be disclosed." Id.
59. See Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Roesberg v. Johns
Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83
F.R.D. 256 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Starr, 81 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
60. Graham, Part One, supra note 1, at 934 n.148.
61. See 63 F.R.D. at 114. Cf. Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(court held plaintiff needs to discover identity of opponent's expert so that he can prepare for
cross-examination if he is called to testify and so that he can decide if he should employ his own
expert). One student commentator argues that discovery of identity should be allowed so that a
party may be aware of "the possible existence of information to which he may be entitled." Once
he discovers identity, he can then demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Comment, Discovery
of Expert Information Under the Federal Rules, 10 U. Rich. L. Rev. 706, 717 n.59 (1976).
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provision that was designed to prevent a party from using his opponent's ex-
pert information to prepare for trial.62 This intent should not be
circumvented.
Rather than on preparation through discovery, emphasis should be
placed on retaining one's own qualified experts to alert a party to different
approaches on which his opponent might rely. A party should rely on his own
expert for information about possible strategies, and if the litigation involves
different theories, the expert can suggest another expert with comparable qual-
ifications to assist in trial preparation. Of course, in most cases the opposing
party must rely on expert witnesses to develop a particular approach, and the
identity of these experts and the facts and opinions on which they will testify
are discoverable through rule 26(b)(4)(A).63 An additional problem arises
when the opposing party has retained all the available experts in a given area
in an attempt to frustrate the opponent's preparation. Applying the Ager anal-
ysis, a party then could demonstrate the requisite exceptional circumstances
and discover the identities of the opposing party's experts, as well as their facts
and opinions. In the majority of cases, however, a party should be required to
rely on his own experts for instruction.
The two-pronged test for the discovery of a nonwitness expert's identity,
as presented in Ager, is firmly rooted in rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s limited discovery
provisions. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) permits discovery "upon a showing of excep-
tional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking dis-
covery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." 64
Commentators65 and courts66 have determined that this requirement was
designed to make discovery difficult. An empirical study, however, concluded
that discovery was permitted more often than would be expected under such a
stringent test.67 The significance of the Ager decision, therefore, is affected
greatly by the courts' interpretation of "exceptional circumstances." For this
decision to have the proper effect, courts must strictly construe the require-
ments for exceptional circumstances.
In Crocket v. Virginia Folding Box Co. 68 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia reasoned that in addition to "exceptional
circumstances," the discovering party must demonstrate "substantial need."
Even though information was unavailable from other experts, the court held
that a party must demonstrate sufficient need to overcome the potential for
62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes.
63. See id. 26(b)(4)(A).
64. Id. 26(b)(4)(B).
65. See, e.g., 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 15, § 2032.
66. See, e.g., Hoover v. United States Dept. of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1142 n.13 (5th Cir.
1980) ("A party seeking disclosure under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) carries a heavy burden."); United
States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Since a litigant will not know what facts the
opposing party's experts have discovered and what opinions they have formed, it will rarely be
possible to make the required showing."). See also 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 15, § 2032
nn.86-87, for a review of other cases.
67. See Graham, Part Two, supra note 27, at 192-93.
68. 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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misuse of discovered information against the retaining party.69 Discovery of
an expert's identity, as it relates to exceptional circumstances, should be no
different from discovery of facts or opinions. The special requirement is
designed to prevent unfairness in permitting the discovering party to use the
retaining party's experts to build his case. 70 The policy considerations devel-
oped in Ager dealt with the same concern7T'-the potential danger that the
information will be used by the discovering party. Nevertheless, it should not
be impossible to demonstrate exceptional circumstances; rather they should be
determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, if a party is unable to locate
a competent expert who is willing to provide assistance on a subject that is
vital to his action or defense, the party should be permitted to discover,
through a properly framed interrogatory, whether the opposing party has re-
tained any experts who are qualified.72
If courts strictly construe the requirements for exceptional circumstances,
the Ager approach should add uniformity to discovery of nontestifying experts
because the standard for discovering an expert's identity differs little from the
standard for discovering his facts or opinions. The Ager court recognized that
the discovery of an expert's identity without exceptional circumstances will
allow a litigant to gather facts and opinions that otherwise would have been
unavailable. Although added precautions, such as contractual agreements, di-
minish the possibility of an abuse of discovery power, the potential still exists.
Furthermore, unlimited discovery could decrease the number of experts, espe-
cially within the medical profession, who will be willing to participate in trial
preparation and litigation that pits expert against expert. In addition to the
policy considerations, discovery of the nontestifying expert's identity must be
subject to the requirement of exceptional circumstances if the primary objec-
tive of rule 26(b)(4)(B)-the protection of the expert's facts and opinions-is
to be preserved. Thus, the.Ager analysis of the discoverability of the identity
69. Id. at 320.
70. In Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
plaintiff, a gasoline marketer, sought discovery of a nontestifying consultant for defendant, a pe-
troleum refiner. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, while recogniz-
ing that the consultant had been specially employed in anticipation of litigation, held that plaintiff
could not discover facts known and opinions held by the expert if it failed to show that it could not
acquire the information from other sources. Id. at 994.
In Dixon v. Cappellini, 88 F.R.D. 1 (M.D. Pa. 1980), the discovering party was able to
demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff, a member of the Unification Church, alleged
that she suffered extreme fright and nervous shock while she was in the custody of defendants,
who were "de-programmers." Defendants sought discovery of the reports and opinions of a psy-
chologist and a psychiatrist who were consulted by plaintiff immediately after the de-program-
ming. The court had reservations about declaring these experts as ones specially employed or
retained in anticipation of litigation but stated that if they were, the rule 26(b)(4)(B) exceptional
circumstances requirement had been met. The court noted that the plaintiff's physical and mental
condition immediately after de-programming was central to the case and that the defendants
could not obtain that information except through discovery of the plaintiff's doctors. Id. at 3.
71. See notes 31-42 and accompanying text supra.
72. Cf. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (defendant could not de-
pose plaintiff's retained expert when there was no showing that defendant was without sufficient
funds or information to obtain comparable opinions).
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of nontestifying, specially employed or retained experts is the preferable
approach.
JAN ALLEN MARKS

